1See, for example, Marsden, [1994].
2Figure 1.1 shows the allegorical frontispiece of the Encyclopédie, which was described by the artist in the following way "We see the Sciences in the act of discovering Truth. Reason and Metaphysics try to remove her veil. Theology waits for her light from a ray originating in the Sky: next to her Memory and History, ancient and modern. Next and below are the Sciences. On the other side Imagination approaches with a garland, to adorn Truth. Beneath her are the various Poetries and Arts. At the bottom are several Skills deriving from the Sciences and the Arts." A detailed commentary is given by May, [1973], available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/40372425.
3Diderot and d'Alembert, [1751-77]
4Johnson, [1755]
5or in later abstracted editions A dictionary of the English language: in which the words are deduced from their originals, explained in their different meanings, and authorized by the names of the writers in whose works they are found
6Cited in Lynch, [2003], p5
7Figure 1.2 is from
8Macaulay, [1898], v1, p54
9Macaulay, [1898], v1, p324
10Macaulay, [1898], v1, p335
11Macaulay, [1898], v1, p350
12Macaulay, [1898], v2, p89
13Macaulay, [1898], v1, pXV
14Between the writing of Macaulay and Cheyney stands F. H. Bradley's The Presuppositions of Critical History, first published in 1874. This work was regarded as a foundation of the "scientific" approach to history. The scientistic aspects of Bradley's approach were criticized by R. G. Collingwood, as has been described by Rubinoff, [1996] p137-8 as follows: "In keeping with the tradition of Hume and J.S.Mill, Bradley conceived the `scientific method' along the lines of the methods of the natural sciences. He was, to this extent, a positivist for whom the natural sciences provided the paradigm of rationality against which all other modes of rationality are to be measured. The historical method thus becomes a mere species of the universal method of science whose generic essence is determined by what is in fact only one of its species, namely the species known as natural science now elevated to the rank of a universal. Without recognizing the category mistake involved in this equation Bradley held this view of the scientific method together with the belief, as we have already noted, that there was an essential difference between the historical processes and those of nature. A Parte Objecti, nature is the permanent amid change; history, the changes of the permanent; natural events are mere illustrations, while historical events are embodiments. It was left for Collingwood to expose the inconsistency of these positions concerning the methodology and ontology of history, and to articulate a conception of method more in keeping with the ontological distinction between nature and history to which both Collingwood and Bradley were committed."
15Cheyney, [1924]
16Collingwood, [1940]
17My philosopher friends point out to me that the word metaphysics is used more technically these days by many of them in ways that are complementary to science. I am not here doubting that metaphysics and science may have much to say to one another and may be mutually supportive. What I am addressing is that in popular perception, at least, metaphysics is in part defined by a distinction from natural science
18Shapin, [1996]
19I am indebted to Hooykaas, [1972] for his compact summary of scientific history, on which I depend heavily in this section.
20Dawkins, [1986].
21Newton, [1687]
22Newton, [1672] cited by Westfall, [1993] p 89.
23Birch, [1966] volume 5, p167-9.
24Michael Faraday, engraved by J. Cochran, from National Portrait Gallery, volume V, published c.1835, after the painting by Henry William Pickersgill.
25Stauffer, [1957] retrieved from
26Macaulay, [1848]
27Bacon, [1605] Book 1, section v, paragraph 11
28Reproduced from the first edition in MIT's Archives and Special Collections by kind permission. With particular thanks to Stephen Skuce, Rare Books Program Coordinator.
29Newton, [1672a] available at
http://www.newtonproject.sussex.ac.uk/catalogue/record/ NATP00006
30See for example Mitton, [1978]. Or a more recent discussion is found in
Stephenson and Green, [2003]
31 Figure 2.4 credit NASA/ESA, , J. Hester and A. Loll (Arizona State University), 2005.
http://www.nasaimages.org/luna/servlet/detail/NVA2 8 8 14234 114775:A-Giant-Hubble-Mosaic-of-the-Crab-N
32See http://www.astronomy.com/asy/default.aspx?c=a\&id=5638
33Figure 2.5 obtained from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Vostok-ice-core-petit.png, based on the data of Petit et al., [1999]
34Lisiecki and Raymo, [2005]
35Hess, [1997] p 16.
36Hess, [1997] p 28.
37Macaulay, [1898] Vol 3 p 71.
38Descartes, [1637] available on line at http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/59
39Descartes, [1637] Part IV.
40There is some technical philosophical debate as to whether "one plus one equals two" is a good example of an analytic statement, but for present purposes I am glossing over some nuances
41Figure 3.1 from
42The reliance on an artifact is considered somewhat unsatisfactory. For one thing it now seems to disagree with its replicas to a measurable extent. There are proposals afoot to change the definition. So far, though, the replacement techniques are substantially less precise than using the standard artifacts. See the article by Robert P Crease in "Physics World", Volume 24, No 3, March 2011, p39.
43Ziman, [1978].
44Ruse, [2000] p78.
45One of the more extreme versions of this position is "eliminative materialism". The common-sense interpretation of the behavior in terms of agents is termed "folk psychology". And eliminative materialism eagerly anticipates the displacement of folk psychology by neurophysiology. Eliminativism holds that the mental concepts such as beliefs, desires, and subjective experiences do not actually exist. Its champions include G.Rey, B.F.Skinner, P.M. and P.S.Churchland, and (with a technically different twist) Daniel Dennett.
46Dawkins, [1986] p 12ff.
47MacKay, [1974] p 43.
48Monod, [1972] p 21.
49At least, not e.g. according to logical positivist philosopher of science, Ernest Nagel, "It is a mistaken assumption that teleological explanations are intelligible only if the things and activities so explained are conscious agents or the products of such agents."Nagel, [1961] p 24.
50in 2010
51Hayek, [1955], p 13.
52An important recent historical study of nineteeth-century scientism is Olson, [2008], which reviews and expands on much the same topics.
53Hayek, [1955] p 120.
54Hayek, [1955] p 170.
55From The New World of Henri Saint-Simon Frank Manuel, Harvard University Press (1956) cited by Olson, [2008] p 52.
56Hayek, [1955] p 153
57See Olson, [2008] pp 185-7.
58Profound developments in the foundations of mathematics were later to correct the over-confidence that a complete axiomatic understanding of mathematics was in hand.
59Haack, [2003] chapter 2.
60The Old and New Logic, Rudolph Carnap, in Logical Positivism A. J. Ayer (ed), Free Press of Glencoe (1959) p 145. Cited by Haack, [2003] p 32.
61Popper, [2002]
62Hempel, [1945]
63Duhem, [1954] p 187, available at
64Quine, [1951]
65Kuhn, [1962]
66Feyerabend, [1975]
67See for example Kitcher, [1983].
68See Giberson, [2008] p 94.
69The ID movement's primary claim is that design in nature can be detected scientifically. It denies far less of scientific cosmology than the earlier Creation Science movement.
70For example Moreland, [1989].
71Chalmers, [1999], p250.
72I am here using the expression natural law as an abbreviation for laws of nature, not as a reference to a basis for civil laws rooted in nature.
73Gardner, [1970].
74Squires, [2004].
75Dawkins, [1986] p 39.
76Dawkins, [1986] p 287.
77Philosophers answer this question by saying that there is a qualitative difference in the type of thing that is being referred to. God as Final Cause is not subject to infinite regress because reference to Final Cause is not the same type of explanation as reference to law of nature or to history. To treat them as the same sort of thing is a Category Mistake.
78Accessible at http://humanorigins.si.edu/
79Available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind08/c7/c7s2.htm
80Miller, [2002] p 166.
81Miller, [2002] p 167.
82on Teaching Evolution, [1998] p 58, at
83Provine, [1988] cited by Miller, [2002] p 171.
84Johnson, [2003a] p 93
85Johnson, [2003b] p 25.
86The first meaning, {1}scientific naturalism, is an extension of naturalism, which "assumes the entire realm of nature to be a closed system of material causes and effects, which cannot be influenced by anything from `outside'," to scientific naturalism, which "makes the same point by starting with the assumption that science, which studies only the natural, is our only reliable path to knowledge".' [Johnson, [1991] p114,115] I've already pointed out the problematical character of the use of "nature" or "natural" as if we intuitively know what they mean. In my terminology, what Johnson means by scientific naturalism is a combination of physicalism and scientism. (This combining of attributes is one cause of confusion.) I take it here that Johnson's {2}science refers to the scientific epistemological enterprise, the attempt to understand the world as far as it can be understood through the methods of natural science. He leaves it unclear whether the {1}physicalism actually is a limitation of {2}science, or whether it is just said to be. However Johnson's view is that adopting physicalism places (by implication improperly) the limitations of {2}science upon reality. This far the argument sounds pretty close to the view I've been advocating. Indeed, I'd say it is about right. But then the terminological fog descends. He says this limitation of reality is "in the interest of maximizing the explanatory power of {3}science". What can this mean? I don't see how it can really mean a maximization of the correct explanations of reality by the scientific epistemological enterprise. Limiting reality doesn't increase the explanatory extent of {2}science. Instead, I think it can only rationally mean that applying {2}science's limitations improperly to all of reality provides improper cultural power to the practitioners and communities that go to make up {3}science. But then when he advocates that we can study organisms on the premise that all were created by God, {4}scientifically - if it means anything different from what we already do in science - this must be yet a different meaning of science. It must mean in accordance with a different epistemological enterprise, not subject to these improper limitations of physicalism. This final broader enterprise: {4}science, we are to understand is (or would be) a Good Thing, but what is it? Perhaps one should regard {4}science as being simply systematic knowledge, or in other words, the historical definition of science of the Encyclopédie or of Collingwood, even though that definition does not readily lend itself to transformation into an adjective or adverb. But to revert suddenly to that archaic usage in the middle of a discourse that has plainly been using the word in the modern sense is very peculiar.
87Johnson, [2003b] p 31.
88Darwin, [1794] available at
89Lamarck, [1809] translations cited at
90Hawkins, [1997] p 42.
91A Desmond The Politics of Evolution 1989, cited by Hawkins, [1997] p 43.
92Hawkins, [1997] p 34.
93Spencer, [1852] available at
94Autobiography I 502, cited by Hawkins, [1997] p 84.
95Spencer, [1873] p 86. Available at
96Hofstadter, [1944] p 31.
97Hofstadter, [1944] p 35.
98Bulmer, [2003] p 79, citing Galton's Inquiries into Human Faculty.
99Galton, [1865] p 164, cited by Bulmer, [2003].
100Galton, [1865] p 165.
101Galton Hereditary Genius 1869, p3 62, cited by Bulmer, [2003] p82.
102Kelves, [1995] p 94, cited by Bulmer, [2003] p 83.
103From Eugenics. Its definition and scope 1904, cited by Bulmer, [2003] p 83.
104Bulmer, [2003] p 89, citing Kühl, [1994].
105Hayek, [1955] p 107.
106Kinsey, [1948].
107Wilson, [1978] p 6.
108Wilson, [1978] p 7.
109Wilson, [1978] p 32.
110Wilson, [1978] p 33.
111Allen et al., [1975] available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/9017
112Wilson, [1978] p 196.
113Wilson, [1978] p 198.
114Wilson, [1978] p 201.
115I prefer the designation `physicalist' to the perhaps more widespread `materialist' because materialism logically implies a more specific basis in matter, which is contradicted by modern theories of physics. But I don't mean to draw philosophically significant distinction between physicalism and a loose meaning of materialism: that everything in the world is made from entities that obey the laws of physics.
116Sorell, [1991] p4.
117Papineau, [2000]
118Papineau, [2000] p 178.
119In Eddington's famous analogy, Eddington, [1939].
120Thagard, [2010] p8.
121Thagard, [2010] p41.
122Thagard, [2010] p15.
123Eugenie Scott of the National Center for Science Education has frequently made the assertion that ID is a ßcience stopper." See, for example, Ëvolution and Intelligent Design," September 28, 2001, Religion and Ethics Newsweekly, Episode no. 504, at
124It might be argued that sociology of scientific knowledge, and the strong program in science studies, don't have all that much in common with postmodern literary theory, with narrative, and with hermeneutics. But I am avoiding fine distinctions with this admittedly broad-brush depiction. And in the broad sense, the sociological critiques do repudiate the `modern' (i.e. Enlightenment) view of science.
125Lyotard, [1984] p xxiv.
126Lyotard, [1984] p xxiii.
127Lyotard, [1984] p 7.
128Lyotard, [1984] p 18.
129Lyotard, [1984] p 27.
130Lyotard, [1984] pp 55ff.
131Gross and Norman, [1994] pp 86-8.
132Sokal and Bricmont, [1998].
133Beller, [1998]
134In an exchange in the New York Review of Books, 3 October 1996
135It may be accessed at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1409
136The opinions arising from a `peace' workshop have been published in
Labinger and Collins, [2001].
137Trevor Pinch in Labinger and Collins, [2001], p19
138A very balanced, succinct outline has been given elsewhere by Heal, [1990].
139Rorty, [1979] p12.
140Rorty, [1979] p317.
141Rorty, [1979] p142.
142Rorty, [1979] p146.
143Rorty, [1979] p170.
144Rorty, [1979] p317.
145Rorty, [1979] p320.
146Rorty, [1979] p332.
147Rorty, [1979] p352.
148It should not escape our notice that Kuhn's scientific "revolutions", analogous in Rorty's mind to the non-science state, are the heroic moments in the history of science. So by this reading, non-sciences are the most exciting, heroic, phase of knowledge.
149Middleton and Walsh, [1995] p 71.
150Habermas, [1971] p 306.
151Habermas, [1971] p 315.
152Harding, [1991] p 15.
153Harding, [1991] p 5.
154Harding, [1991] p 10.
155Harding, [1991] p 40.
156Alvares, [1988] p 89.
157Alvares, [1988] p 91
158Shiva, [1988] p 232.
159Ellul, [1964] p (x).
160Ellul, [1964] p 59.
161Ellul, [1964] p 84.
162Ellul, [1964] p 92.
163Ellul, [1964] p 96.
164Ellul, [1964] p 128.
165Ellul, [1964] p 134.
166Ellul, [1964] p 430.
167Postman, [1993] p 48.
168Postman, [1993] p 161.
169Postman, [1993] p 184.
170Postman, [1993] p 198.
171I use the adjective militant in its standard dictionary definition and usage to mean vigorously active and aggressive, especially in support of a cause. Though its derivation is of course associated with warfare, it does not necessarily imply literal violence. Moreover, while I criticize the recent atheist militancy as misinformed and misleading especially in their scientism, I intend the word militant as a factual description not as an insult
172Dawkins, [2006] p 48.
173Dawkins, [2006] p 50.
174Dawkins, [2006] p 58.
175Dawkins, [2006] p 57.
176Dawkins, [2006] p 58.
177Pinker, [1999] p X.
178Pinker, [1999] p 156.
179Pinker, [1999] p 166.
180Pinker, [1999] p 451-2.
181Sulloway, [1995].
182Pinker, [1999] p 555.
183Dennett, [2006] p 9.
184Dennett, [2006] p 14.
185Dennett, [2006] p 17.
186Dennett, [2006] p 18.
187Dennett, [2006] p 30.
188Dennett, [2006] p 33.
189I don't see how this is really a worry, because religious believers presumably don't think that killing all the specimens of religion is possible, and atheists don't worry about it, they want it.
190Dennett, [2006] p 43.
191Dennett, [2006] p 68.
192Dennett, [2006] p 70.
193Fig 9.1 is the first figure from Gould and Lewontin, [1979], reproduced by permission.
194Dennett, [2006] p 114.
195Ahouse and Berwick, [1998,Kitcher, [1985,Orr, [2003].
196http://www.bostonreview.net/BR23.3/pinker.html Originally published in the Summer 1998 issue of Boston Review.
197Allen et al., [1975].
Originally published in the Summer 1998 issue of Boston Review.
199Dennett, [2006] p 70.
200I don't mean to say that the atheists claim to have disproved religion logically. Scientific demonstration is, after all, not formally deductive. Their predominant claim is that the "God Hypothesis" is shown by science to be highly unlikely. Lest it be thought that I am overstating the atheists' claims, I cite the title to Victor J Stenger's 2008 opus, fulsomely endorsed by Christopher Hitchens: The God Hypothesis-How Science Shows That God Does Not Exist.
201Polanyi, [1958] p286.
202Polanyi, [1958] p284.
203Polanyi, [1958] p 279,280.
204Dawkins, [2006] p 181.
205Dawkins, [2006] p 184.
206Dawkins, [2006] p 187.
207Pascal, [1958] Pensée 894, originally published posthumously in 1670.
208See for example Stark, [2003] or d'Souza, [2007], for a discussion of the estimates of deaths under the Inquisition relative to Stalinism and Nazism.
209Dawkins, [2006] p 271. Any thoughtful observer who has paid any attention to what Martin Luther King actually said and wrote must acknowledge that his Christian faith is absolutely central to his motivation and to his arguments.
210Dawkins, [2006] p 278.
211A recent scholarly study of the question of religious violence, Cavanaugh, [2009], shows how (and why) most commentators fail to maintain a stable meaning for the term. It also shows that the religious nature of the so-called "Wars of Religion" is largely a myth.
212Gould, [1999] p 5.
213James Clerk Maxwell famously responded in very similar terms to the Bishop of Glouster and Wells concerning the significance of the "aether".
214Gould, [1999] p 42.
215Biagioli, [1996]
216White, [1896].
217Gould, [1999] p 94.
218I believe the misinterpretation of the first amendment to exclude religion from schools is the dominant factor.
219Gould, [1999] p 154.
220Image obtained from http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki
221White was careful to draw a distinction between sectarian theology, meaning broadly doctrinal or confessional Christian faith which his book condemned, and his own vaguer liberal religiosity, which he regarded as enlightened, but which excluded any requirement of Christian orthodoxy
222Birch, [1966] volume 5, p 508ff.
223Augustine of Hippo and Teske, [1991] 1, 20 available on line as passage number 1685 in Jurgens, [1979]. http://books.google.com/books?id=rkvLsueY_DwC
224Bacon, [1605], cited by Darwin in the front page of the Origin of Species.
225See for example Alexander, [2001] chapter 6, for a summary of the content of the early geological rivalries.
226A D White's tendentious chapter on Higher Criticism is rife with expressions of this sort, even to the point of invoking approvingly Auguste Comte's positivism. Perhaps this is appropriate since the positivist George Eliot was the first to translate the works of the German critics Strauss and Feuerbach into English.
227Jaki, [1978].
228And, by derivation, Judaism, but I can't represent modern Judaism knowledgeably.
229Whitehead, [1948] p 13.
230Whitehead, [1948] p 19.
231Hooykaas, [1972] p xiii.
232Hooykaas, [1972] p9.
233See for example the 50 year anniversary talk by Chris Stringer, 2003. On-line at
234It might be argued that the Enemy, Satan, is responsible for this deception, but such a view is not consistent with Christian understanding of God's sovereignty.
235Gosse, [1857].
236Cited in Thwaite, [2002]
238Title 46 part 46. Available at
239Coulson, [1958] p86.

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